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ABSTRACT
Apostasy, the abandonment of Islam, can be subdivided into the act of
apostasy, and its legal consequences. In Egyptian case law of the past fifty
years, only the latter plays a role. The act of apostasy hardly needs to be
scrutinized by the courts since it is almost never related to religious
conviction, but to legal issues like marriage or inheritance. This was
different, however, in the 1996 ruling of the Court of Cassation against the
Egyptian Muslim scholar Nasr Abu Zayd: here, the behavior of the accused
was the central issue. Still, it will be argued, based on the legal notion of
public policy that plays a central role in the issue of apostasy, that the
court’s ruling was consistent with Egyptian jurisprudence in this matter.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Egyptian Court of Cassation ruled that the writings of the
Egyptian Muslim scholar, Nasr Abu Zayd, on Islam constituted an act of
apostasy, the abandonment of one’s religion. Being declared an apostate by
the court resulted in the ugly repercussion that Abu Zayd’s marriage was
declared void. Human rights organizations were up in arms, and the case
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received international attention. It was a period when Islamists took on the
battle for the implementation of Shari‘a law to the Egyptian courts. I am of
the opinion, however, that Abu Zayd was the victim of principles that
traditionally have been upheld by Egypt’s judiciary, rather than of an
upheaval of Islamic fundamentalism.
These same principles, however, have lead to the apparent contradic-
tion in Egyptian legal discourse between disallowing apostasy, on the one
hand, while upholding the international and constitutional right of freedom
of religion, on the other hand. Closer reading of most Egyptian apostasy
cases, including the Abu Zayd case, reveal that the key lies with the concept
of “public policy” (al-nizam al-‘amm). I will argue that both the act of
apostasy as well as its consequences, which are two entirely different issues,
and their relation to the freedom of religion can be understood more clearly
in light of the concept of public policy.
In order to do so, I will evaluate the Egyptian case law of the highest
civil courts on apostasy from the past fifty years. The main focus will be on
the Court of Cassation, which has the most substantive record of apostasy
cases, almost exclusively dealing with family and inheritance law. Two
other high courts, whose case law will be examined, are the Administrative
Courts of the Supreme Council, which deals with conflicts between citizens
and state institutions, and the Supreme Constitutional Court. The latter has
not ruled on apostasy, but its relevance to this article relates to its
interpretation of Islamic law and the freedom of religion in Egypt. The
criminal and security courts are not included in this research primarily
because they do not deal with apostasy in terms of conversion per se, nor
will I pay attention to the views of both “classical” and contemporary
Islamic scholars on the issue of apostasy, unless they are referred to by the
courts.1
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF APOSTASY
It is important to clarify a matter of terminology regarding conversion,
which in Egyptian legal discourse is dominated by Islamic jargon. The term
apostasy (ridda) is reserved for Muslims. Only a Muslim can “apostate,” that
is abandon or renounce his religion. Whether the apostate converts to
another religion or merely wants to give up Islam is irrelevant. Consequently,
1. See, for instance, the collection of statements and articles on apostasy by prominent
contemporary Egyptian orthodox-Muslim scholars related to the 1993 trial of the
assassins of Farag Foda, in Muhakama al-Murtaddiyin (Cairo, no date), by Ahmad al-
Sayoufi.
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there is no word in Islamic legal jargon—nor in common Arabic legal or
colloquial parlance, for that matter—for conversion by a Muslim. Non-
Muslims, on the other hand, are not said to apostate, but to “change
religion”; the decision by a Christian to give up all religion and truly
apostate by becoming an atheist, for example, is apparently unimaginable.
Finally, when a non-Muslim converts to Islam, it is said that he has
“embraced Islam.”
In Egypt, as in many other Muslim states, apostasy enjoys a limbo status.
According to Islamic law, apostasy is prohibited, and even is punishable by
death. Contemporary Egyptian jurisprudence refers to the prohibition of
apostasy, but not to the death penalty. Egyptian statutory law, on the other
hand, does not make any reference to apostasy. The omission of any such
rule, however, should not be taken as a permission of apostasy, as both the
Court of Cassation and the Supreme Administrative Court have ruled.2 The
Administrative Court voiced the general opinion of Egyptian Muslim society
that “it is completely acceptable for non-Muslims to embrace Islam but by
consensus Muslims are not allowed to embrace another religion or to
become of no religion at all.”3
Generally speaking, this unacceptability of apostasy manifests itself in
two areas. First, apostasy might be reprimanded, or even punished, by
relatives of the apostate or other members of society, and sometimes even
by police or state security agencies,4 but the legal repercussions are very
few. Our interest here is the strictly legal side of apostasy, which manifests
itself solely in the realm of Egyptian Muslim personal status. Again, no rule
2. Court of Cassation No. 28, Year 33, 19 Jan. 1966; No. 20, Year 34, 30 Mar. 1966.
Supreme Administrative Court, No. 240, Year 22, 13 May 1973. Also: State Council in its
Legal Ruling (Fatwa) Nr. 804 of 2 Dec. 1962 in which reference is made to an earlier
ruling of the Administrative Court, Nr. 195, Year 4, 26 May 1952 (mentioned by A.‘Abd
al-Barr, Dawr Majlis al-Dawla al-Masri fi Himayat al-Huquq wa al-Huriyat al-Amma
292–99 (1991)).
3. Case No. 20, Year 29, 8 Apr. 1980 (discussed by Ahmed Seif al-Islam Hamad, Legal
Plurality and Legitimation of Human Rights Abuses: A Case Study of State Council
Rulings Concerning the Rights of Apostates, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD 222–24
(Baudouin Dupret, Maurits Berger, & Laila al-Zwaini eds., 1999).
4. Apostasy is not prohibited by the Penal Code, but the police and security agencies
regularly are reported to detain—and subsequently, often maltreat or even torture—
Muslims accused of apostasy based on either Article 98f of the Penal Code prohibiting
the use of religion to “ignite strife, degrade any of the heavenly religions or harm national
unity or social peace,” or on the wide powers of the Emergency Laws. These detainees
are rarely prosecuted, however, which may indicate that detention and torture merely
serve as a way of harassment. The few prosecutions that have taken place were
undertaken by the State Security Courts, and mainly targeted authors whose books were
considered anti-Islamic by the Islamic al-Azhar Institute. An example is the case of Alaa
Hamed whose alleged mockery of Islam in his novels was considered a threat to
“national unity” and “social peace.” Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS
1993: EGYPT (1993).
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prohibiting apostasy can be found in the codified part of this law,5 but
should be sought in the remnant non-codified rules that are based on “the
prevalent opinion of the Hanafi doctrine.”6
The rules of apostasy, therefore, are limited to the field of personal status
law. This is not surprising, since personal status is one of the few fields of
law where the religion of the individual is a determining factor. In Egypt,
several religious family laws co-exist: there are one Muslim, six Christian,
and two Jewish laws; although the non-Muslim minority in Egypt nowadays
is composed almost exclusively of Christians.7 To apply the appropriate law,
the Egyptian court must first determine the religion of the litigant. There is
no such thing as a civil marriage in Egypt—the person without religion, or
with another religion other than those covered by the laws mentioned, will
be governed by Egyptian Muslim family law. Religion—and hence conver-
sion—therefore are not private matters of the individual, but bear significant
legal consequences. Conversion does not only allow a person to take part in
sermons in another church, but also implies the application of the family
law of that church.
Another aspect of the rules of apostasy is that, within the realm of
personal status law, these rules can be found only in case law, since no
statutory law exists on the subject. The picture that emerges from analysis of
the—quite numerous—Egyptian case law, in this respect, is quite consistent.
Apostasy is perceived as a legal impediment to almost all personal status
rights by virtue of the apostate having incurred civil death.8 The repercus-
sions mentioned in the case law of the Court of Cassation are related mostly
to marriage and inheritance. Apostasy renders the marriage of the apostate
null and void (batil), results in the separation (tafriq) of the spouses,9 and
prevents the apostate from entering into a (new) marriage, even with a
5. Laws No. 25 of 1920, No. 25 of 1929, No. 100 of 1985 and No.1 of 2000. In addition,
guardianship is codified in Laws Nos. 118 and 119 of 1952, family name, family ties and
legal capacity in the Civil Code of 1949, and inheritance law in Laws No. 77 of 1943 and
No. 71 of 1946.
6. Decree on the Organisation of the Shari‘a Courts, art. 280 (1931). Within Islamic law,
four schools of legal doctrine apply. These schools have spread geographically
throughout the Muslim world. The Hanafi school, for instance, applies in most of the
Middle East.
7. No exact numbers are available. Estimates of the number of Christians in Egypt vary from
three to fifteen million out of a total population of approximately sixty million, with six
million (10 percent of the population) being the most commonly used figure.
8. “Apostasy is in a way equal to death” (al-ridda fi ma‘na al-mawt ). Court of Cassation,
No. 20, Year 34, 30 Mar. 1966; No. 162, Year 26, 16 May 1995.
9. Court of Cassation No. 20, Year 34, 30 Mar. 1966; No. 25, Year 37, 29 May 1968; Nos.
475, 478, 481, Year 65, 5 Aug. 1996; No. 25, Year 37, 29 May 1969. Also Supreme
Administrative Court No. 240, Year 22, 13 May 1973 (discussed by Seif al-Islam Hamed,
Legal Plurality and Legitimation of Human Rights Abuses, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB
WORLD, supra note 3, at 225–28.
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non-Muslim.10 An apostate is excluded from inheritance,11 and all blood ties
with his or her children will be considered non-existent, regardless of
whether the apostasy of the parent took place before or after their birth.12
According to the Court of Cassation, an apostate should be given the
opportunity to repent and “return” to Islam, in which case a new marriage
contract and dowry are required to resume marital life.13 The repentance
should be a clear affirmation of re-adopting Islam, but the Court also has
taken as sufficient affirmation the fact that the new passport that was
requested by the apostate mentioned “Muslim” as religion; in Egypt, one’s
religion is registered in personal identity certificates.14
It is a well-known fact that few Muslims convert to another religion.
This also applies to Egypt. Still, the case material mentioned above shows
that there have been quite a few legal actions involving apostates in Egypt.
From this case law, it appears that this phenomenon can be attributed to the
use and abuse of apostasy as a legal strategy in the family court. For
instance, according to Egyptian inheritance law, which is based on Islamic
law, intestate succession between Muslims and non-Muslims is not al-
lowed.15 Many of these cases show the sorry sight of siblings and relatives
accusing each other of apostasy in order to exclude the other from the
inheritance. Another example is the prohibition of marriage between a
Christian man and a Muslim woman. Since it is both socially and legally
impossible for the woman to denounce Islam and adopt Christianity, it is
usually the man who will convert to Islam in order to marry his fiancée.
However, in the case when he merely converted to fulfill the condition of
marriage, remaining truthful to his Christian faith renders him an apostate.16
Also, due to the sheer impossibility under Christian laws to obtain a divorce,
a woman may resort to converting to Islam to render the marriage with her
Christian husband void. And a Christian husband, who is faced with the
10. Such marriage is “considered as not concluded.” Cases No. 20, Year 34, 30 Mar. 1966;
No. 9, Year 44, 24 Dec. 1975; No. 162, Year 62, 16 May 1995.
11. Cases No. 28, Year 33, 19 Jan. 1966; No. 17, Year 39, 10 Apr. 1974; No. 162, Year 62,
16 May 1995. Also Legal Ruling (Fatwa) Nr. 804 of 2 Dec. 1962 by the Advisory Section
of the State Council (discussed by ‘Abd al-Barr, supra note 2, at 292–99) and Supreme
Administrative Court No. 240, Year 22, 13 May 1973.
12. Cases No. 9, Year 44, 24 Dec. 1975; No. 162, Year 62, 16 May 1995.
13. Cases No. 34, Year 55, 27 Nov. 1990; Nos. 475, 478, 481, Year 65, 5 Aug. 1996.
14. Case No. 37, Year 32, 21 Apr. 1965.
15. Law 73, art. 6 (1) (1947).
16. The Supreme Administrative Court was asked to look into the case of a Christian widow
of a Christian university professor. She was considered an apostate for having previously
converted to Islam and then reverted to Christianity in order to marry her husband. The
fact that the civil court case had been filed by the deceased’s sister gave reason to believe
that it was her intention to exclude her brother’s wife from the inheritance. (Case No.
240, Year 22, 13 May 1973.)
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same legal obstacles to divorce, may opt for conversion to Islam to obtain
the right to divorce his wife by means of repudiation (talaq).17
III. PUBLIC POLICY (1)
In Egypt, apostasy usually becomes a legal issue only with regard to its
consequences, which are limited to the field of personal status. Accusations
or self-proclamations of apostasy before the court, therefore, mostly serve
purposes that do not necessarily have any relation to the apostate’s religious
convictions. The “civil death” incurred by apostasy merely creates several legal
impediments as to the validity of the marriage and the inheritance. An apostate,
for instance, may not marry, or when already married, should be divorced,
and an apostate is not entitled to inherit or to bequeath. These impediments
are the “rules of apostasy,” and both the Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court have held that these rules pertain to public policy.18
The concept of public policy (al-nizam al-‘amm) was introduced into
Egyptian law along with many other European—primarily French—legal
concepts, which were adopted in Egypt by the end of the nineteenth
century. It stands for those legal principles that are considered fundamental
to a society, and which may not be contradicted, altered, or violated by any
rules or laws of that same society. Public policy usually refers to foreign law:
while domestic conflicts rules may decide on the admissibility of a foreign
law, application of this law may be rebutted when it violates domestic
public policy. The cases of domestic law itself violating public policy will be
few, since domestic laws are based on the very same fundamental principles
that constitute public policy. In the case of apostasy, the Egyptian judiciary
has maintained the principle that the rules of apostasy constitute rules of
public policy. Not attaching any legal consequences to apostasy, therefore,
is tantamount to violating Egyptian public policy.
In order to explain the reasoning behind the public policy character of
the rules of apostasy, we have to go back to the definition of public policy
itself. In several rulings the Court of Cassation has defined public policy as
“the social, political, economical or moral principles in a state related to the
highest (or essential) interest (maslaha ‘ulya, or: masalih jawhariyya) of
society,” or as “the essence (kiyan) of the nation.”19 In the legal literature,
17. Cf. Maurits Berger, Public Policy and Islamic Law: The Modern Dhimmi in Contempo-
rary Egyptian Family Law, 1 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y (2001).
18. Cf. Supreme Administrative Court, No. 240, Year 22, 13 May 1973. Court of Cassation,
No. 9, Year 44, 14 Dec. 1975 and Nos. 475, 478, 481, Year 65, 5 Aug. 1996.
19. Cases No. 308, Year 29, 25 June 1964; No. 371, Year 32, 5 Apr. 1967; No. 22, Year 34,
7 Nov. 1967; No. 59, Year 39, 12 Feb. 1975; No. 7, Year 48, 19 Jan. 1977; No. 714,
Year 47, 26 Apr. 1982; No. 1259, Year 49, 13 June 1983.
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generally, reference is made either to this Court ruling or to the similar
definition presented by the late jurist, al-Sanhuri, who is still a legal
authority in Egypt, which further defines the general interest as always
predominating the interests of individuals.20 The “principles” or “interest”
that make up public policy are never clearly delineated, as they depend on
the particular circumstances of a given society at a given time. Their
definition, therefore, is left to the courts, as they are deemed the best suited
to establish, on an ad hoc basis, when a legal act or statute should be
considered a violation of public policy.
All of this is consistent with the general definitions used in most
European legal systems. In Egyptian legal discourse, however, there is no
doubt that a major element of Egyptian public policy is the “essential
principles of Islamic law” (al-mabadi al-asasiyya fi ahkam al-shari‘a al-
islamiyya).21 The Court of Cassation, in several instances, has stated that these
rules pertain to public policy due to their “strong link to the legal and social
foundations which are deep-rooted in the conscience of [Egyptian] society.”22
Both the Court of Cassation and the legal literature define the “essential
principles of Islamic law” as the principles that are considered fixed and
indisputable (nass sarih qati’ al-thubut wa qati’ al-dalala).23 The phrase “fixed
and indisputable rules” is a technical term used in the Islamic literature for
rules of Islamic law that are not subject to change or interpretation. This
terminology also is used now in contemporary Egyptian legal discourse.24
20. A. al-Sanhuri, 3 Masadir al-Haqq fi al-Fiqh al-Islami, 81 (1953), quoted in 1 AL-WAS T FI
SHARH AL-QANUN AL-MADANI 399 (1964).
21. S.‘Abd al-Wahhab, al-Nizam al-‘Amm fi al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya fi Masr, 39 AL-MUHAMAH
350 (1958); R. ABU SA‘UD, WAS T FI SHARH AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYA LI-GHAYR AL-MUSLIMIN 425–26
(1986); H. AL-‘AHWANI, SHARH MABADI’ AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA LI-L-MASIHIYIN AL-MASRIYIN 180
(1993/94); M. JARIHI, MUKHTASAR AL-‘AHKAM AL-SHAR‘IYYA FI AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA LI-GHAYR AL-
MUSLIMIN 53 (1984/85); A. MA’MUN, DURUS FI AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA LI-GHAYR AL-MUSLIMIN 39–
40 (1984); M.H. MANSUR, AL-NIZAM AL-QANUNI LI-L-USRA FI AL-SHAWIRI’ GHAYR ISLAMIYYA 44
(1983); M. Muhammad, AHKAM AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA LI-GHAYR AL-MUSLIMIN MIN AL-MARIYIN
159 (1997); A. MURSI, MABADI’ AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA LI-L-MASRIYIN GHAYR AL-MUSLIMIN 191–93
(1996); A.H. NAJIDAH, MABADI’ AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA LI-GHAYR AL-MUSLIMIN 53 (1998/99);
A.A. Salamah, al-Maqsud bi-Ahkam al-Shari‘a al-Islamiya allati tanabiqu fi Masa’il al-
Ahwal al-Shakhsiyya li-ghayr al-Muslimin, MAJALLAT AL-ULUM AL-QANUNIYYA WA AL-IQTISADIYYA,
313, 336 (1960); J. AL-SHARQAWI, AL-‘AHWAL AL-SHAKHSIYYA LI-GHAYR AL-MUSLIMIN, 25 (1974).
22. No. 17, Year 32, 27 May 1964; No. 482, Year 50, 14 June 1981; No. 36, Year 61, and
No. 154, Year 63, 25 Dec. 1995.
23. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, supra note 21, at 350; ABU SA‘UD, supra note 21, at 437; al-‘Ahwani,
supra note 21, at 180; M.A. ‘ARAFA, AL-QANUN AL-DUWALI AL-KHASS; AL-KITAB AL-THANI FI AL-
TANAZU‘ AL-DUWALI LI-L-QAWANIN 141 (1993); A. Khallaf, Tafsir al-Nusus al-Qanuniyya wa
Ta’wilu-hu 31 MUHAMAT 188 (1950/51); MURSI, supra note 21, at 192.
24. The Supreme Constitutional Court gave an extensive definition of this term in several
rulings in the 1990s, explaining that the Egyptian legislature was allowed only to amend,
change, or re-interpret those rules of Islamic law of a “relative” nature, while those of an
“absolute” nature were not subject to any change or interpretation. In its 1993 ruling, the
Court phrased this as follows:
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Examples of such undisputable rules are the unilateral right of the husband to
divorce his wife (talaq), the right of polygyny, and the prohibition for a
Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim husband.25 According to the Court of
Cassation26 and the State Council,27 the rules of apostasy also pertain to these
undisputable principles.
The public policy nature of most of these rules had to be emphasized
because they are not codified. In the case of apostasy, the Court of Cassation
and the Supreme Administrative Court disproved the claim that the rules of
apostasy did not apply since they were not mentioned in any law. Indeed,
these rules are not codified, the courts argued, but nevertheless, they apply
since they pertain to the fundamental legal order of Egyptian society, that of
public policy.28
So far, with regard to the consequences of apostasy, Egyptian case law
has been consistent and relatively clear. The apostasy case of Nasr Abu
Zayd was based on these very same rules, but was exceptional for two
reasons. First, the issue at hand essentially was not of family law but of
apostasy itself. Second, public policy was to play an important role in the
alleged contradiction between the prohibition of apostasy and the freedom
of religion. Both will be discussed below.
Article 2 of the Constitution means that a stipulation of law (nass tashri‘i) may not contradict the
Shari‘a rules which are absolute in their origin and significance (al-ahkam al-shara‘iyya al-
qata‘iyya fi thubuti-ha wa dalalati-ha.) These are rules that may not be interpreted (la yajuz al-
ijtihad fi-ha). They represent the general principles and immutable fundamentals (al-mabadi’ al-
kulliyya wa al-‘usul al thabita) of the Islamic Shari‘a that do not tolerate interpretation or change
(ta’wil aw tabdil). Hence, it is unimaginable that their meaning (mafhum) is subject to change in
time and place. This is different for the rules that are of a relative nature (al-ahkam al-zanniyya),
whether in their origin or significance or both; interpretation is confined to them and does not
extend beyond them, and they change with time and place to safeguard their flexibility and
vitality. It is necessary, however, that this interpretation takes place within the framework of
general fundamentals (al-‘usul al-kulliyya) of the Islamic Shari‘a.
(SCC No. 7, Year 8, 15 May 1993 (see for French translations: Nathalie Bernard-
Maugiron, Legal Pluralism and the Closure of the Legal Field: The al-Muhajir Case, in
LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 3, at 116; Baudouin Dupret, A propos de
l’affaire Abu Zayd, universitaire poursuivi pour apostasie; le procès, l’argumentation des
tribunauxi, MAGHR B-MACHREK (1996)). The SCC gave an English summary of this ruling in
56 THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1997), but I find its translation
inadequate.)
In a subsequent ruling, the Supreme Administrative Court used similar wordings (No.
5257, Year 43, 28 Dec. 1997). In a ruling fifteen years earlier, this court spoke in more
general terms of “the preservation and protection of Divine rights” (No. 240, Year 22, 13
May 1973).
25. For a full inventory of these rules and court rulings see Berger, supra note 17.
26. Cases No. 28, Year 33, 19 Jan. 1966; No. 20, Year 34, 30 Mar. 1966.
27. Thus the Islamic Shari‘a applies to a Muslim . . . and it is a matter of consensus that the Islamic Shari‘a
contains certain rules dealing with personal status affairs that may not be ignored, since they are part
of public order. Among these are the rules concerning apostasy. . . . In ruling that an apostate’s
marriage is invalid, Divine rights are preserved and protected.
(Case No. 240, Year 22, 13 May 1973.)
28. Court of Cassation and Supreme Administrative Court, supra note 2.
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IV. APOSTASY: THE ACT ITSELF
Muslims have no choice when it comes to religion. A child is born a Muslim
if his father is a Muslim. There is no need to reassert the faith at a later age.29
How then does a court establish the fact of apostasy, that is, the abandon-
ment of the Islamic faith?30 Based on the case law, it is proven mostly with
documents, such as affidavits of conversion, or identification cards, and
marriage and divorce certificates, on which the religion of the persons in
question is registered. But without written evidence, apostasy is hard to
prove.31
The case of Nasr Abu Zayd32 is unique in the legal landscape of
apostasy cases in several respects. First, the accusation of apostasy did not
serve any legal purpose related to personal status law. Why would a
claimant go to such lengths to prove someone’s apostasy? It appears that the
Abu Zayd case served no other purpose than settling personal or political
29. Court of Cassation, No. 44, Year 40, 29 Jan. 1975. In this case, the Court ruled that if the
father of the child converts to Islam after his child is born, the child automatically
becomes a Muslim if he is less than fifteen years old (the age when a person is considered
to be physically and intellectually mature (baligh wa ‘aqil )).
30. In cases of conversions among non-Muslims (“changing religion”), the decision as to
whether or not a conversion has taken place is to be made by the religion, rite, or sect
to which one converts, and not the one that is being abandoned (Court of Cassation, No.
29, Year 34, 30 Mar. 1966; No. 2, Year 37, 31 Jan. 1968; No. 28, Year 37, 31 Jan. 1968;
No. 44, Year 40, 29 Jan. 1975). The fact that the law of the abandoned religion might
oppose the conversion and consequently deem the marriage null and void is of no
consequence. The request by a Jewish husband for nullification of his marriage in
accordance with Jewish law because of his conversion to Islam therefore was denied
(Court of Cassation, No. 20, Year 36, 7 May 1969).
31. The following case is illustrative of how complex things might become. A Christian man
has a child, then converts to Islam and has another child. Based on the rule that the child
follows his father in religion, the first child is Christian and his sibling Muslim. When the
father died, both children claimed the full inheritance with the exclusion of the other
child because of the difference with the deceased’s religion. The Muslim child had the
advantage because there was clear evidence of his father’s conversion to Islam. The
Christian child then proceeded by claiming his father’s apostasy, but was unable to build
a case. (Court of Cassation, No. 17, Year 39, 10 Apr. 1974.)
32. Court of Cassation, Nos. 475, 478, 481, Year 65, 5 Aug. 1996 (hereinafter “Court of
Cassation 5 Aug. 1996”). For lengthy extracts of the Appeal Court and Court of Cassation
see Maurits Berger & Baudouin Dupret, Jurisprudence Abu Zayd: Extrats des arrests du
Tribunal d’Instance de Giza, de la Cour de l’Appel du Caire (traduit vers le français) et de
la Cour de Cassation (traduit vers l’anglais), in DRO TS D’EGYPT: HISTOIRE ET SOCIOLOGIE, EGYPT
MONDE ARABE (Centre d’Etudes et de Documentation Economique et Juridique (2nd Sem.
1998)). For commentaries see, e.g., Kilian Bälz, Submitting Faith to Judicial Scrutiny
Through the Family Trial: The Abu Zayd Case, 37 DIE WELT DES ISLAMS 135–55 (1997);
Baudouin Dupret, A propos de l’affaire Abu Zayd, universitaire poursuivi pour apostasie;
le procès; l’argumentation des tribunaux, supra note 24; Baudouin Dupret & Jean-Noel
Ferré, Participer au pouvoir, c’est édicter la norme: À propos de l’affaire Abu Zayd
(Egypte 1992–1996), 47 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POL TIQUE, 762–75 (1997).
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scores.33 In order to do so, Abu Zayd’s accusers made clever use of the
existing rules in Egyptian law and jurisprudence on apostasy.
The first legal obstacle they had to overcome was one of procedure: the
law required a “personal interest,” such as any direct legal purpose, interest,
or right, other than the mere accusation of apostasy itself by the claimants.
Since the claimants did not have any such direct and personal interest in
their accusation of Abu Zayd’s apostasy, they referred to the procedure of
hisba, which allows any Muslim to file a case against a fellow Muslim
suspected of violating the so-called “rights of God,” or the essential
elements of the Islamic faith.34 The use of the hisba procedure was an issue
of legal controversy among the courts,35 but was used successfully against
Abu Zayd.36 By opting for this legal approach, however, the claimants—
several individuals with no relation to Abu Zayd, except for a concern for
Abu Zayd’s interpretation of Islam—could not suffice with the demand for a
court ruling on Abu Zayd’s apostasy: they had to invoke his apostasy as a
legal impediment to his marriage. In other words: while the affirmation of
Abu Zayd’s apostasy was effectively the goal, it had to be legally con-
structed as the means.
The second unique feature of the Abu Zayd case was that his alleged
apostasy was not related to conversion on his part, but to blasphemy. This
was a matter of legal evidence: Abu Zayd’s apostasy was not based on a
document or self-pronounced conversion, but on his writings on Islam. In
the light of Abu Zayd’s insistence on being a Muslim and his writings being
in conformity with his Islamic beliefs, the Court had to embark on the
33. In the case of Nasr Abu Zayd, a referee reader of the committee in charge of evaluating
Abu Zayd’s work in order to grant him the position of professor had deemed his work
anti-Islamic. It is upon the instigation of Abu Zayd’s accuser that his alleged apostasy was
brought before the court. According to Abu Zayd, a personal grudge was involved. See
Nasr Abu Zayd, Inquisition Trial in Egypt, RECHT VAN DE ISLAM, 48 (1998).
34. Since the Abu Zayd case, much has been written on hisba. See, e.g., Bälz, supra note 32,
at 138–43; Jörn Thielmann, La jurisprudence égyptienne sur la requête en hisba, in
DRO TS D’EGYPT: HISTOIRE ET SOCIOLOGIE, EGYPT MONDE ARABE, supra note 32, at 81; AHMAD SUBHI
MANSUR, AL-HISBA: DIRASA ‘USULIYYA TARIKHIYYA (1995).
35. For instance, in the Abu Zayd case, hisba was rejected by the Court of First Instance, but
accepted by both the Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation, while in the
abovementioned Muhajir case, which took place at the same time, hisba was accepted
in the first instance but rejected in the summary appeal proceedings.
36. While the Abu Zayd case was pending before the Court of Cassation, hisba has been re-
legalized as a procedure in which the claimant can merely make a complaint with the
Prosecutor’s office, who at his own discretion may decide whether he will press charges
(CIVIL CODE art. 3 (1996)). This amendment was invoked by Abu Zayd’s defense counsel,
but the Court decided that a change of law could not affect a pending case. In April
2001, the Egyptian Public Prosecutor was petitioned to prosecute the Egyptian feminist
writer Nawal al-Saadawy, who was declared a heretic by the Egyptian Grand Mufti for
her critical remarks on principal matters of Islam, such as the veil, the pilgrimage and
inheritance law. The Prosecutor’s office refused, and the subsequent plea to the court for
divorcing al-Saadawy from her husband was rejected also.
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difficult task of evaluating these writings in order to decide whether he was
indeed guilty of blasphemy, and consequently, apostasy. This kind of
accusation has happened to other Egyptian Muslims before, often by the
Islamic Research Institute at Al-Azhar, which censors books on their Islamic
value, and occasionally, by Islamic extremists, but those cases were never
taken to court.37 Most cases that were brought before the Court were
accusations of non-conformity with Islam rather than apostasy; the claim-
ants demanding the ban of a book38 or film,39 or a governmental decree.40
Finally, the third unique feature of the Abu Zayd case was that the Court
of Cassation allowed takfir, declaring a Muslim a non-believer; although,
the Court did not mention this expression in so many words. This is a very
controversial issue, since such an accusation is considered one of the
“greater sins” in Islam, to be exercised only with great caution due to its
complexity and grave consequences.41
The Nasr Abu Zayd case, therefore, constitutes a key ruling in the case
37. One of the first accusations was made against the—nowadays renown scholar—Taha
Hussain for the content of his Ph.D. dissertation written at the Azhar University in the
1930s. Such an accusation cost the life of the Egyptian writer and human rights activist,
Farag Foda, who was very critical of the Islamic establishment. He was shot dead by an
Islamic extremist in 1992, one week after he had been branded an apostate by the al-
Azhar. Two years later, there was an assassination attempt on the novelist Naguib
Mahfouz after he had been declared an apostate by an Islamic extremist group. In 1997,
the al-Azhar Front for Scholars accused Hassan Hanafi, a philosophy professor at Cairo
University, of apostasy, but the case was never pursued and faded away without any
repercussions for Hassan Hanafi. See, e.g., ARTICLE 19, THE EGYPTIAN PREDICAMENT: ISLAMISTS,
THE STATE AND CENSORSHIP 47–55 (1997). To my knowledge at the time of writing, the latest
accusation of apostasy and heresy was made against the abovementioned Nawal al-
Saadawy by the Egyptian Grand Mufti (see, e.g., AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, 12 Apr. 2001, No.
529).
38. To my knowledge at the time of writing, no cases related to books of alleged un-Islamic
content have been brought before a civil court. The Islamic Research Institute at Al-
Azhar University has legal authority to censor books on conformity with Islamic dogma
but, by lack of authority to confiscate, usually will refer these cases to the State Security
Court.
39. For instance, the film al-Muhajir (the Emigrant) by Youssef Chahine, was said to recount
the life of Joseph, who is considered a prophet in Islam and, therefore, may not be
portrayed by an actor. The film was ultimately banned on procedural rather than
substantive grounds. (See the analysis by Bernard-Maugiron, supra note 24, at 173–89.)
40. For instance, the 1994 decree by the Ministry of Education banning the head scarf at
schools, and the 1996 decree by the Ministry of Health prohibiting the practice of female
circumcision (both extensively discussed by Kilian Bälz, The Secular Reconstruction of
Islamic Law: The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court and the “Battle over the Veil” in
State-Run Schools, in LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 3, at 229–44, Kilian
Bälz, Human Rights, the Rule of Law and the Construction of Tradition: The Egyptian
Supreme Administrative Court and Female Circumcision, in DRO TS D’EGYPT: HISTOIRE ET
SOCIOLOGIE, EGYPT MONDE ARABE supra note 32, at 141–54.
41. Cf. MOHAMMAD KAMALI, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN ISLAM 186 (1997). See also (the former Mufti
of Egypt), Shaykh Mohammed al-Tantawi, AL-AHRAM 8 Dec. 1981 & 10 Nov. 1992. Both
scholars point out that only a learned person like a judge or jurisconsult (mufti) is entitled
to declare someone an infidel.
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law of the Court of Cassation. For the first time, the Court defines what
apostasy is and how it can be committed. In this ruling, the Court adheres to
the principles of Islamic doctrine by defining apostasy as “a clear declara-
tion of unbelief (kufr)” by a Muslim. As long as a Muslim does not proclaim
himself an apostate, however, he cannot be considered one. Only Muslims
who openly denounce Islam can be considered apostates. In the words of
the Court:
Merely believing the mentioned [unbelief] is not considered apostasy, unless it
is embodied in words or actions. According to the majority of the Muslim legal
scholars, among them the Hanafis, it suffices to consider a person an apostate
once he deliberately speaks or acts in unbelief, as long as he meant to be
degrading, contemptuous, obstinate, or mocking.42
The Court’s definition reflects the overlap in Islamic doctrine of the
definitions of apostasy, blasphemy, unbelief, and heresy,43 all of which are
used by the Court in different meanings, but with the single unifying factor
that they all lead to apostasy. Based on the publications written by Abu Zayd
in his capacity as a professor of Arabic Language and Islamic Studies at the
Liberal Arts Faculty of Cairo University, where he was teaching Quranic
Sciences, the Court found him guilty (as if it were a criminal court) on all
three charges. The Court’s reasoning—among others—is as follows:
He denounces that the Quran is the word of God, describing it as “a cultural
product,” . . . and as being affiliated to a human culture, rendering it an
incarnated human text. . . .
He describes [Islam] as an Arabic religion, denying its universality and
availability to everybody. . . .
He attacks the application of the Shari’a by describing it as backward and
reactionary. He claims that the Shari‘a is the reason behind the backwardness of
Muslims and their degradation. . . . He states that abiding by Shari‘a texts is
contradictory to civilization and progress and hinders the proceeding of life. He
accuses the theological method as clashing with the mind by stating that “there
is a battle being fought by the powers of the superstition and myth in the name
of religion and literal meanings of religious texts and by the intellectual powers
42. Court of Cassation 5 Aug. 1996, supra note 32.
43. Blasphemy (sabb Allah wa sabb al-Rasul ) generally is subsumed under apostasy (ridda),
since the Muslim blasphemer is assumed to renounce his religion also. The Court defines
it as
[S]corning the Quran or the Prophetic Sunna, or mocking, repudiating, or disavowing them, or
intentionally claiming anything contradicting them publicly or haughtily, or doubting any of it, . . .
denying God’s existence or His creation as mentioned in the Quran, . . . repudiating the Prophecy
of Mohammed—peace be upon him—or in general his prophecy to all people, or doubting his
sincerity.
Both blasphemy and apostasy may be considered unbelief or denial of Islam (kufr), or
amount to heresy (zandaqah). See Carl Ernst, Blasphemy: The Islamic Concept, 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION, (1987); KAMALI, supra note 41, at 212–21.
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of progress trying to fight sometimes with superstition on its own ground.” This
is clear unbelief! . . .
He goes as far as calling for a liberation from Shari’a Texts, claiming that
they lack any essential and fixed elements, and that they only express a historic
phase which has passed. This is an accusation that the law of God is not
suitable for all times. . . .
He denies that God Almighty is [physically] on His great Throne and that
His Chair encompasses the Heavens and Earth, and that He created Paradise,
Hell, Angels and Demons, although the Qur’anic verses categorically stipulate
all that. . . .
He boldly proceeded in this approach, which is opposed to Islam in its
meanings, dogmas and fundamentals, denying the main fundamentals of its
sacredness. He did not hesitate to contradict established truths, even historic
ones. . . . while he was fully aware of its meaning and truth within the balance
of the Shari‘a.44
It may be clear from these excerpts that the Court adheres to a strict
interpretation of Islam. In addition, the Court takes the very conservative
stand that an unbeliever—and hence apostate—is also the Muslim who
takes a too liberal point of view in interpreting Islamic tenets,45 or claims
that the Islamic Shari‘a is not fit for application nowadays. The last two
definitions of “unbelief” are a clear warning to the Muslim liberals and
secularists, respectively.
Abu Zayd’s claim that his writings were not against Islam because he
was a believing Muslim turned out to be the noose around his neck:
He is an apostate, because he has revealed his unbelief after having been a
believer, even if he claims to be a Muslim. . . . An apostate cannot be excused
when he claims to be a Muslim, because he has adopted a stance contrary to
Islam. But then a heretic (al-zandiq) usually talks about his infidelity and
proclaims his wrong faith while at the same time claiming that he is a Muslim.
(Court of Cassation 5 Aug. 1996)
V. PUBLIC POLICY (2)
In the Abu Zayd case the Court also linked apostasy with public policy, but
did so in a quite different manner. The rules of apostasy, as discussed in the
first paragraph, usually are dealt with in a rather matter-of-fact way: when
one apostates, one has to face the consequences. Public policy was merely
44. Court of Cassation 5 Aug. 1996, supra note 32.
45. This, the Court argues, cannot be tolerated “because the proofs of their existence are
evident: the Qur’an and Sunna are full of them and they are accepted by consensus.” An
example of this offense is “proclaiming that the Quran is not coming from God or that it
is man-made.”
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a means to ground these consequences into the Egyptian legal framework.
In this respect, apostasy pertains to public policy for two reasons: a) because
these rules were based on essential principles of the Islamic Shari‘a, and b)
to ascertain their applicability in light of a lack of any statutory rules.
In the case of Abu Zayd, however, public policy acquires an entirely
different role. The consequences of apostasy are not the issue here, but the
protection of the orthodoxy of Islam. In the words of the Court of Cassation:
To depart from Islam is to revolt against it, and this necessarily finds its reflection
in the loyalty of the individual to the Shari‘a, the state, and his ties with the
society. This is what no law or state tolerates. . . . No individual has the right to
proclaim that which contradicts the public policy or morals (al-nizam al-‘amm
aw al-‘adab), use his opinion to harm the fundamentals upon which the society
is built, to revile the sacred things, or to disdain Islam or any other heavenly
religion.46
In this respect, public policy goes beyond the legal proportions, and gains a
moral and metaphysical dimension. Protection is the key word here.
Egyptian legal scholars have argued that public policy serves the “protection
of the rights of the Muslim” (himayat huquq al-muslim),47 or that its rules are
equal to the “rights of God” (huquq Allah).48 In both instances, the scholars’
meanings are the same: God has granted the Muslims certain “rights” that
are “definite,” and hence, inalienable.49 The legal consequence of apostasy
is one of these rules that need to be “protected,” or strictly adhered to.
Deviation from these rules is tantamount to a violation of public policy. And
this is where apostasy has acquired its second meaning in the Abu Zayd
case: the public attack on, or doubt of, any of the fundamental rules of
Islam.
VI. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
As mentioned in the introduction, it is the concept of public policy that may
help to solve the riddle of the apparent contradiction of Egyptian jurispru-
dence disallowing apostasy, on the one hand, while upholding the freedom
of religion on the other. In order to do so, some general remarks have to be
46. Court of Cassation 5 Aug. 1996, supra note 32.
47. This is discussed extensively in Maurits Berger, Conflicts Law and Public Policy in
Egyptian Family Law: Islamic Law through the Back Door, 3 AM. J. COMP. L. (2002).
48. See, e.g., Sanhuri, supra note 20, at 93.
49. It should be born in mind that the term “rights” is misleading because the rules contain
both rights (the husband has the right to divorce his wife by repudiation) and obligations
(the woman must keep a waiting period—idda—after divorce or death of her husband),
as well as general injunctions (a Muslim woman is not allowed to marry a non-Muslim
man).
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made about how the freedom of religion is embedded in the Egyptian legal
framework.
The freedom of religion is mentioned in the Egyptian constitution as
well as in numerous instruments of international law to which Egypt is party.
Both will be discussed in detail below. With respect to the international
human right of freedom of religion, Egypt’s position must be seen within the
wider framework of the Muslim world. Most Muslim states maintain that
Muslims are not allowed to abrogate their faith.50 This view was not yet
vigorously defended by the few independent Muslim states during the
discussions of the (non-binding) Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) of 1948, which stipulates in Article 18:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his belief, and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in teaching, practice, worship and observance.51
The Muslim states were more alert with the (binding) International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, which Egypt ratified in 1982.52
It was through their instigation that Article 18 of the UDHR, which allowed
the “freedom to change his belief,” was amended to “freedom to have or
adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice.”53 Although this still appears to
give a person the freedom to change his or her religion, Egypt is of the
opinion that this provision does not violate “the rules of Shari‘a law.”54
50. See, e.g., ANN E. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, TRAD TION AND POL TICS, 142 (2d ed. 1995).
51. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess. (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) art. 18,
reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT’L L. Supp. 127 (1949).
52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 19 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) (hereinafter ICCPR).
53. See, e.g. Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights in Islamic States,
12 HUM. RTS. Q. 214–18 (1990); Brice Dickson, The United Nations and Freedom of
Religion, 44 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 342 (1995); MAYER, supra note 50, at 142.
54. Egypt, upon ratification of the covenant in 1982, added the following statement: “Taking
into consideration the provisions of the Islamic Shari‘a and the fact that they do not
conflict with the text [i.e. the Covenant] . . . we accept, support and ratify it.” This could
be explained as an exception clause, but is more likely to be an assurance that the ICCPR
is consistent with the Islamic Shari‘a. See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious
Dissidents under Islamic Law, 14 WIS. INT’L L.J. 397 (1996). In addition, The Human
Rights Committee established by the ICCPR to receive and review reports from member
states as to their compliance with the Covenant, has asked questions about the possible
conflict between the Covenant and the Shari‘a, but according to Egyptian government
officials there was no contradiction between the two. Kevin Boyle, International Human
Rights Law and the Egyptian State, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT 75–76 & 81–82 (Kevin Boyle & Adele Omar Sherif eds.,
1996).
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As to the Egyptian Constitution, Article 46 reads: “The state shall
guarantee the freedom of belief and the freedom of practice of religious
rites.”55 Article 2, which is of importance in the discussion of Article 46
reads: “The Islamic Shari‘a is the main source of legislation.”56
While the interpretation and application of the Constitution is the
exclusive prerogative of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the international
treaties signed by Egypt may be applied directly by the Egyptian courts or
called upon by Egyptian litigants.57 These rules are not adhered to strictly,
however, since constitutional rights also were invoked before and discussed
by the Court of Cassation in the Abu Zayd case, without reference being
made to the same rights as stipulated in international treaties.
Procedural matters being as they may, the issue of substantive law was
dealt with as follows: Egyptian legal discourse confines the scope of
freedom of religion usually to non-Muslims in Egypt. It is often stated both
in case law and legal literature that the constitutional “freedom of belief”
means that non-Muslims should be free to practice their faith unhindered, as
well as administer their own religious affairs, including family law.58
Similarly, conversion by non-Muslims, which effectively means that a
religion or church is abandoned to embrace another, also is not to be
interfered with, as the Court of Cassation has ruled on many occasions59: “it
is standard jurisprudence of this court that it is up to the person to change
his rite or sect (milla aw ta’ifa60).”
With regard to Muslims, on the other hand, the situation is considered
to be completely different. The most clarifying explanation in this respect
has been given by the Supreme Constitutional Court in the case of “the
battle of the veil.” The decree of the Minister of Education banning the veil
from state schools was opposed before the Court with the argument that
such prohibition violated the freedom of belief. The Court rejected this plea,
pointing out the difference between the “freedom of belief” and the
55. EGYPT CONST. art. 46.
56. Id. art. 2.
57. Id. art. 151.
58. See, e.g., H. al-hwani, Himayat al-Hurriyat al-Shakhsiyya fi Rawabit al-Qanan al-Khass,
33 MAJALLAT AL-‘ULUM AL-QANUNIYYA WA AL-IQTISADIYYA 58–59 (1991); see also State Council
(Supreme Administrative Court) No. 501, Year 4, 25 Apr. 1959 (discussed by ‘Abd al-
Barr, supra note 2, at 283–90).
59. Case No. 17, Year 43, 5 Nov. 1975. Also: No. 3, Year 35, 23 Mar. 1966; No. 29, Year
34, 30 Mar. 1966; No. 2, Year 37, 31 Jan. 1968; No. 5, Year 41, 11 Apr. 1973; No. 3,
Year 46, 29 Feb. 1976; No. 3, Year 46, 29 Dec. 1976; No. 21, Year 45, 9 Mar. 1977; No.
23, Year 46, 26 Apr. 1978; No. 29, Year 47, 28 Mar. 1979; No. 5, Year 48, 16 Apr. 1980;
No. 46, Year 48, 17 Jan. 1981; No. 41, Year 54, 9 Apr. 1985; No. 68, Year 53, 24 Dec.
1985; No. 40, Year 62, 27 Nov. 1995; No. 280, Year 62, 16 Dec. 1996.
60. Milla and ta’ifa are terms for the sects and subdivisions of the Jewish and Christian
communities.
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“freedom of practice of religious rites.” The Court interpreted the “freedom
of belief” as a guarantee to practice one’s belief unhindered, and made the
following qualifications:
The first of these two [i.e. the freedom of belief] is unrestricted, while the
second [i.e. the practice of this belief] may be restricted by means of its
[internal] order to affirm some of its highest interests, and in particular on the
grounds of preserving public policy and moral values [al-nizam al-‘amm wa al-
‘adab] and to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.61
The Court was of the opinion that the obligation to wear the veil was not an
undisputable rule of Islamic law. Hence, it qualified as a practice rather than
as a belief, and therefore, was open to limitations in the interest of public
policy; in this case the dress code at school was part of the supervising
function of the governmental function of supervising education.
The same reasoning has been applied by the Court of Cassation and the
Administrative Courts in matters of apostasy (that until now has not been a
subject dealt with by the Constitutional Court): where the freedom of belief
implies that one could never be forced to become a Muslim, once a person
is a Muslim, he has to submit to the rules of Islam as a matter of the practice
of that religion. In 1980, the Supreme Administrative Court phrased this as
follows:
Since Islam protects the freedom of belief—for Islam may not be forced on
anyone—freedom of belief as granted by the Constitution means that each
individual may freely embrace whichever religion he believes without con-
straint. However, this freedom does not restrict the application of the Islamic
Shari‘a to those who embrace Islam. The State’s religion is Islam. . . . Since the
plaintiff has embraced Islam, he must then submit to its law which does not
condone apostasy.62
The Court of Cassation has ruled in similar wordings in several cases, the
last being the Abu Zayd case:
The purpose of entering Islam is to abide by its rules, including those of
apostasy. . . . The rules for apostasy are no more than measures to keep a
Muslim in his Islam, distinguishing him from others. . . . This is what also
happens in other religious laws with regard to their followers: they demand
continuous loyalty to them. Once an individual joins in, he is to abide by its
rules which can expel or segregate him if he violates their fundamental
61. Case No. 8, Year 17, 18 May 1996. See Bälz, The Secular Reconstruction of Islamic Law,
supra note 40, at 229–44. Before the case came before the Supreme Constitutional Court,
the Supreme Administrative Court had ruled that the decree did not conflict with the
freedom of belief, but declared the decree void because it contravened the personal
freedom to dress oneself according to one’s wishes. (Case No. 4237, Year 40, 23 Aug.
1994.)
62. Case No. 20, Year 29, 8 Apr. 1980.
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63. Similar rulings were No. 20, Year 34, 30 Mar. 1966; No. 162, Year 62, 16 May 1995.
64. Case No. 20, Year 29, 8 Apr. 1980.
65. ICCPR, supra note 52, art. 18 (3) in fact stipulates: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or
beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and
freedoms of others.” (emphasis added).
principles which he embraced. . . . Certain religious laws . . . consider a
difference of religion an impediment to marriage which prevents its conclusion,
and they consequently impose separation or divorce. The same applies when
one of the spouses embraces another religion. This does not violate the freedom
of belief.63
VII. PUBLIC POLICY (3)
According to the case law of the three highest Egyptian civil courts, neither
the act of apostasy, nor its legal consequences, are related to the freedom of
religion. Apostasy in the courts’ definition does not pertain to a freedom of
belief, which is interpreted as the right to practice one’s belief free of any
coercion or prejudice. Apostasy is part of the practice of a belief, the
regulation of which is left to the “internal order” of that particular religion.
It is the freedom of the internal order of that religion to prohibit or allow
apostasy, as it is the freedom of that order to stipulate marriage impediments
based on, for instance, the difference in religion between the spouses.
While the freedom of belief may not be restricted, conditions can be
made on the freedom of its practice. These conditions are related to public
policy, albeit in different ways. First, both the Egyptian Constitution (in the
interpretation of the Supreme Constitutional Court64) and the ICCPR65 allow
for this freedom to be restricted on the basis of public policy. This can work
two ways. For one, religious practice may be restricted for considerations of
government policy, which also, confusingly, is referred to as “public policy.”
This may force the authorities to impose limitations—as in the “battle over
the veil” case. On the other hand, when some of these religious practices
themselves pertain to public policy, they are not to be restricted in any way
whatsoever. As it turns out, Egyptian public policy does not allow apostasy,
and therefore, this prohibition may not be tempered by a “free” practice of
Islam.
In the Abu Zayd case, the restrictions on the freedom to practice Islam
were carried even further when, in this instance, the Court of Cassation
argued that a Muslim making public statements contrary to the orthodoxy of
Islam violates Egyptian public policy. The Court did not interpret this in
terms of freedom of religion, however, but as a matter of freedom of opinion
(Article 47 Constitution):
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To depart from Islam is to revolt against it, and this necessarily finds its reflection
in the loyalty of the individual to the Shari‘a, the state, and his ties with the
society. This is what no law or state tolerates. Hence, the Shari‘a and all other
constitutions and laws permit freedom of opinion within the limits of public
policy that prohibits wrong doing or misuse of a right. No individual has the
right to call for what contradicts the public policy or moral values (al-nizam al-
‘amm aw al-’adab), or use his opinion to harm the fundamentals upon which
the society is built, or to revile the sacred things, or to disdain Islam or any other
heavenly religion.66
The latter use of public policy shows the duality of apostasy in Egyptian
legal discourse: a strict distinction is being made between the legal
consequences of apostasy, which are merely perceived as a legal impedi-
ment in matters of personal status, and the acts leading to apostasy, such as
pronouncing unbelief or blasphemy, resulting in the violation of public
morals. Both are related to public policy, but differently: in the first case,
public policy is the justification for the strict adherence to the rules of
apostasy, while in the second case, public policy serves as the protecting
shield for the orthodoxy of Islam.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The prohibition of apostasy for a Muslim, as defined in Islamic law, is
enforced in all its consequences in Egypt, except for the death penalty. This
prohibition has no foundation in legislation, but is based directly on Islamic
law, which, in turn, is mentioned in several Egyptian laws as a source of law.
The three highest civil courts in Egypt, the Court of Cassation, the Supreme
Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Administrative Court of the State
Council, have upheld this rule for at least the past half century. The
prohibition of apostasy, the courts agree, is one of the rules that come with
being a Muslim. And being a Muslim is as inalienable a part of a person as
one’s color or sex.
There is a blatant contradiction between, on the one hand, the
prohibition of apostasy and, on the other hand, the constitutional guarantee
of “freedom of belief” and similar provisions in the international human
rights treaties to which Egypt has committed itself. The courts do not see this
contradiction—or choose not to see it—because they base their rulings on
two assumptions. First, apostasy is one of the “definite” Islamic rules, and
hence, is part of Egypt’s public policy; that is, the fundamentals of the legal
order. Second, the rules of apostasy are part of the freedom to practice one’s
66. EGYPT CONST. art. 47.
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religion, which, according to both the Supreme Constitutional Court, as
well as the ICCPR, is subject to restrictions of, inter alia, public policy.
Hence, the prohibition of apostasy is considered to be outside the scope of
unrestricted freedoms.
While the courts’ position on the (Islamic) interpretation of apostasy
itself has undergone no change in Egypt, the developments in the 1990s had
serious repercussions. Until the 1990s, apostasy was mostly a clear situation
of conversion, that is, an intentional act by a Muslim to convert to another
religion. Usually, these converts had been Christians before becoming
Muslim, and their conversions often were documented or otherwise easy to
prove. Case law mainly dealt with the consequences of apostasy. During the
1990s, however, accusations of apostasy by third parties abounded, based
on alleged blasphemous or heretical writings by the accused Muslim. These
cases largely were instigated by the conservative religious establishment, in
particular the Islamic Research Institute at Al-Azhar.
This caused the second feature of the 1990s to develop: a power
struggle between Muslim jurists and the courts over the monopoly on
authoritative interpretation of Islamic law, which appears to have been won
by the courts.67 This was only possible because of the conservative position
of these courts with regard to Islamic law. The Egyptian courts—especially
the highest courts—are secular courts with a long-standing reputation of
neutrality and non-partiality. However, when presented with questions on
Islamic law, they show a tendency to embrace a conservative interpretation
of Islam. This is not new—the courts have always done so. It was only when
the Islamic religious discourse was taken to the court room that this attitude
became more apparent. The courts have not become more Islamic, but they
have been confronted with more “Islamic” cases than before. Nor is there a
sudden increase of Islamic rules being incorporated into the order of the
secular law, as some have argued.68 Islamic rules have always been part of
the secular legal order. On many occasions in the past, the three courts have
made clear that “definite” rules of Islamic law are fundamental to the
Egyptian legal order. Few of these rules were codified, however, but retained
their importance through public policy. As such, these Islamic rules become
visible only in the case law of the Egyptian courts. Only now, with an
increasing case load dealing with “Islamic” issues, does this essential
character of the Egyptian legal order manifest itself more clearly.
Regardless of the unanimous opinion of the highest civil courts in Egypt
on the prohibition of apostasy, for many it still represents a clear example of
a human rights violation. Care should be taken, however, not to be drawn
67. See Bälz, The Secular Reconstruction of Islamic Law, supra note 40, at 243.
68. Id. at 237–38.
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too easily into the general discourse on human rights violations in Muslim
countries. This discourse considers most human rights violations to be the
result of the political atmosphere. This is correct for a majority of cases, and
it is equally correct to conclude that many of these violations have nothing
to do with Islam, even when Islam is used as a justification.69 But this
political dimension is absent in the particular case of apostasy in Egypt: we
are dealing with a sound rule of Islamic law that has been upheld for many
decennia by a judiciary that generally is recognized as independent. By
upholding this rule, the judiciary expresses a fundamental belief and,
indeed, the public policy as perceived by a majority of Egyptian Muslims.
These established legal rules on apostasy, however, have become the
subject of abuse. In the Abu Zayd case, the Egyptian judiciary has, for the
first time, passed judgement on what an apostate is rather than on the legal
consequences of apostasy. By defining apostasy in the Abu Zayd case, the
Court of Cassation has ruled on the content of Islamic doctrine. All this was
done in the name of public policy, i.e. the fundamental principles of the
Egyptian society. The public policy that was initially aimed at protecting the
adherence to specific rules regarding apostasy, however, has turned into the
protection of Islamic doctrine at large.
69. See Heiner Bielefeld, Muslim Voices in the Human Rights Debate, 17 HUM. RTS Q. 595
(1995); F. Halliday, Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights: the Case of the
Islamic Middle East, 43 POL. STUD. 153 (1995); MAYER, supra note 50, at xvii.
